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Abstract
Research in community health introduces challenges regarding analysis of the research data. It involves multiple actors in a varity
of arenas, and it is often directed towards the local community and children and their families. The legal, ethical and privacy
issues involved introduce constraints upon the analysis performed. SNOOP combined with the D2Worm declarative modelling and
infrastructure architecture is a promising approach to support a wide range of possible privacy preserving analysis in community
health research.
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1. Introduction
Community health research is a complex research field, due to the numbers of different possible factors concern-
ing one case. The number of actors involved might differ, the multiple variations of relevant arenas, and even the
informants’ involvements and role might vary within and among the cases. Typical in community health research, the
problem is about prevention or rehabilitation, and the health community directed their intervention towards both the
patients and the surroundings. It might be the family, the network, the health and social services, or community based
institutions. Community health services aimed at children will often involve schools, kinder gardens, and even leisure
activities. All of these arenas, with all of these different actors, might be resources in community health research. It
means that there are legal, ethical, practical and privacy issues involved when collecting and analyzing data in health
community research, and these issues introduce a set of constraints upon the computations and implementations1. In
this paper, we will suggest a solution that can handles this complexity. We will focus on the practical approach to
meet these challenges using SNOOP and data-centric workflow modelling (SNOOP is just a name and not an abbre-
viation for anything). We will first introduce SNOOP as a privacy conserving distributed computation platform that
can be used to perform SMC (Secure Multiparty Computation) algorithms to analyse community health data. We will
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then discuss how workflow modelling and D2Worm (Distributed Data-centric WORkflow Management system) can
introduce a high level data-centric modelling of such computations and the challenges related to privacy preserving
processing with such an approach.
2. Community health research
Internationally there is a growing interest in community health services at the expenses of specialised health ser-
vice2,3. A simplified, but descriptive classification is that the specialized health services focus on treatments and tar-
geted interventions while the community health service focus on prevention and rehabilitation. A specialised health
service system is typically individual oriented and takes place in hospitals or other treatments centers. Prevention
and rehabilitation in community health, however, take place locally, where the people live their lives. Intervention for
prevention and rehabilitation is often oriented towards the public, and aims often collective. Despite that specialized
health workers might outline the intervention in community health service, the performer of the health services might
varies. It can be the teachers, the social workers, or nurses in community health centers that actually implements the
health interventions. The community health research have to mirror these variations of possible actors and arenas
when studying these interventions.
In community health, there has been an emphasis towards the policy of investments of the wellbeing for children,
and the children’s prospects to a healthy, productive, and meaningful life where they can fulfil their potential4. One of
the reason is that is has proven economical profitable for a society to invest in children: “The evidence is quite clear
that inequality in the development of human capabilities produces negative social and economic outcomes that can
and should be prevented with investments in early childhood education, particularly targeted toward disadvantaged
children and their families”5. Investments in early childhood is also demonstrated as efficient for adult health6. To
prevent unwanted prospects is cheaper than the price of treating and caring for a life that does not fulfill its potential.
For community health research, this insight have directed the research towards the intervention that it targeted to
the youngest population. In doing so, the research face a number of challenges that make the data computation
complicated. The childrens age might make it necessary to involve others informants on their behalf. When and how
the children have to be involved are controlled by different ethical regimes. The difference in the childrens age might
also affect the way the inquiry is outlines, meaning that addressing the same issues might need multiple questionnaires.
This is a complexity in doing community health research that makes it resource demanding in addition to the ethical
challenges.
In sum, the local focus in community health and that prevention is targeting children as a population, are aspects
that provides challenges for research in community health. Collecting and analysing data is more challenging. In spe-
cialized health service in hospitals, the patients come to the researchers. In community health research, the researchers
have to go to local communities and visit the patients in their own environments. The researchers have to handle that
the possible informants for an evaluation of an intervention might be differ and that the questionnaire might be in
multiple variations. These challenges are the starting point for our discussion concerning infrastructure and services
to facilitate research in the complexity of community health service.
3. Data computation in community health research
Important aspects of data in community health research are that (i) the data might contain sensitive personal
information, (ii) the data is collected from a wide range of sources, and (iii) the data at-rest is distributed. Data with
sensitive information about patients, research subjects, or informants raises privacy concerns, and access to the data
has to be tightly controlled. By combining data from several sources, more knowledge about individuals and groups
of people can be gained. Both this new knowledge and intermediate results from such computations might be sensitive
and should be included when privacy concerns are analysed.
Data about a single patient, a research subject, or an informant, might be distributed among several nodes (data
servers with vertically partitioned datasets). With community health research data, vertically partitioned datasets at-
rest are typically distributed over a wide range of institutions, including hospitals, general practitioners, specialist,
labs, and social service offices. In horizontally partitioned datasets, one type of data about a large number of patients,
research subjects, or informants might be distributed among several nodes. A typical example is data collected by
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Table 1. The notation used for messages, encryption and signing in this text and in earlier papers on SNOOP 16,17.
(a, b, c) A group with the elements a, b, c {m}n m signed by n
{m} A message containing m {m}np m signed by n and encrypted with public key p
s{m} m encrypted with secret key s {n, p}c CA c binds public key p to identity n
{m}p m encrypted with public key p A→ B : {m} Message {m} sent from A to B
general practitioners. Each patient is bound to one general practitioner, but for a large number of patients many general
practitioners might be the source of that type of data. In real examples, both vertically and horizontally partitioned
datasets might exist, and legal, ethical, and privacy aspects of managing those datasets have to be respected. These
aspects might enforce local processing of data at-rest at the node.
Privacy preserving distributed analysis of community health research data can be achieved by combining cryptog-
raphy, suitable algorithms, constrain specification and enforcement, explicit workflow models (that can be analysed
for privacy concerns), and carefully designed workflow run-times. Cryptography is used to protect data at-rest and
in-transit. Symmetric encryption with unique encryption keys is a flexible and efficient way to ensure confidentiality.
Combined with public-key encryption and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the confidentiality provided by symmetric
encryption can be extended with data integrity and secure sharing of data7. The algorithms used in the data analysis
can contribute to the privacy preserving part of data processing. In the book chapter Privacy preserving personali-
sation in complex ecosystems8, the privacy preserving processing in the context of personalisation is discussed. This
can be directly mapped to privacy preserving processing in the context of community health research data. Local
processing of data at-rest, de-identifying data (e.g. differential privacy9,10), Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)11,
and homomorphic encryption12, are examples of algorithmic approaches to privacy preserving data analysis. These
approaches can be used individually or combined. In some cases, constrains have to be specified and enforced to
obstruct privacy violations. An example is re-identifying data when the number of individuals in the dataset is small.
The process of analysing distributed community health research data can be modeled as workflows13. Data-centric
workflow modeling (as opposed to flow-based) promises a flexible and adaptable approach to model and create such
processes14. The data focus of data-centric approaches is a good basis for conducting the legal, ethical and privacy
concerns of community health data research. Since the focus is on the data, constraints and protective operations
related to these data could be included in the workflow modeling.
SNOOP is a middleware built to support the constructions, deployment and execution of applications performing
analysis of sensitive distributed data. SNOOP supports contract based deployment of components in SNOOP run-
times. The contracts are in SNOOP used to match the software component requirements with the run-time resources
and requirements. At deploy time the component and the run-time tries to fulfill the contract. If succeeded the
component is deployed and activated. The contract is also used to explicit specify what data, services and resources
the component in the given context can access at the host it is deployed. Operations executed at a single host are a
subset of a complete data analysis. The host is typically a general practice or a hospital, and it is a participant in the
data analysis. The contract of a component includes a signed delegation from an approved authority that in a given
context grants access to the specified data to perform the operations executed by the component.
The D2Worm14 infrastructure is used to model data-centric workflows. It is based on the Guard-Stage-Milestone
(GSM)15 meta-model for lifecycles. Current data-centric modelling approaches (including GSM) do not provide
syntactical mechanisms to restrict data exchange across organisational boundaries and existing workflow management
systems for data-centric workflows are not capable to enforce data privacy.
4. SNOOP
Before we continue, a short introduction to SNOOP is given. A more detailed introduction to SNOOP is available
in other papers16,17. With SNOOP, a typical approach to fulfill the privacy requirements is a combination of SMC
algorithms and careful usage of cryptography. It is based on a coordinator that prepares the computation and a set
of sub-processes representing the parties in the multi-party computation. The coordinator and the sub-processes are
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nodes in a computation graph. The directed edges of the graph are the messages sent between the nodes. Each node
has an identifier (address) and a unique public/private encryption key pair.
The combination of SMC algorithms and public-key encryption (in combination with symmetric key encryption)
ensure that each node is unable to learn about the other nodes local data, input data and intermediate results. PKI
and its certificate authorities (CAs) ensure that the participants can distribute and trust public keys. PKI enables
public-keys as the tool to authenticate participants and maintain the integrity and privacy of the data exchanged.
4.1. Computing graph
The computing graph for a computation is represented as a set of layered messages, where each layer in these
messages exposes the next edges in the directed graph. The computation is initiated by the coordinator sending these
messages to the first set of nodes. At each node one layer of the received message is decrypted exposing both the
input data set for the calculation performed at this node, and the identifier and public-key of the next nodes in the
computing graph. The calculation is performed using the input data set and local data available at this node.
When the calculation is done the node generates a set of messages forwarded to the next nodes in the computing
graph. The public-keys are used to encrypt the messages. The data sets included in these messages are based on the
result of the performed calculation. The notation used is described in Table 1.
A node na will receive and unwrap a set of messages signed by the senders ni and containing input data sets I′a and
data blobs B′a:
ni → na :
{ {I′a}pa , B′a
}ni
The input data set I′a is encrypted with the public key pa of na is a subset of Ia. Ia represents sufficient data to perform
the calculation at node na. It might be aggregated from a set of input messages containing subsets I′a of the data. The
data blobs B′a originate at the coordinator c. Ba represents the view of the computing graph from node na. It might be
aggregated from a set of input messages containing subsets B′a of the data. In most cases, a single B
′
a is equal to the
complete view Ba. The data blobs have the following structure:
B′a =
{
input node list, output node list, meta data
}c
pa
The input node list includes all the nodes that node na should expect input from. In many use-cases this list contains
a single node, the node that this message was received from. The input node list is used for two things: (i) to verify
that the coordinator intended this input to the node, and (ii) to inform the node what input to wait for before the
computation is performed. If node na in our example should only expect input from node ni, the input node list would
be the single element (ni, pi). This is used in node na to verify that it was the coordinator’s intention that node na
should receive this input from node ni.
The output node list describes the next nodes in the computing graph. It lists the nodes receiving the intermediate
results calculated in this node. For each node a data blob generated specifically for that node by the coordinator is
also included. If node na in our example is supposed to forward its intermediate results to the three nodes no, np, and
nq, the output node list will be this:
(
(no, po, Bo), (np, pp, Bp), (nq, pq, Bq)
)
Figure 1 shows node na with an input node list with a single element ni and an output node list with the element
no, np, and nq.
The meta data contains information needed to perform the computation at this node and to ensure progress if
anythings fails. The meta data received at node na is denoted Ea. More details on the significance and usage of the
meta-data are found in other SNOOP papers16,17.











Each node na will perform its calculation f using the received data set Ia and its local data set:
Ra = f (Ia)
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Fig. 1. The input node list of na is ni and the output node list of na is no, np, and nq.
F is a filter function that removes data from a data set that should not be forwarded to a given node. F(Ra, no) produces
a new data set I′o where only the data that should be available for node no is present:
I′o = F(Ra, no)
From node na all the next nodes nx in the computing graph (no, np, and nq in the example above) are forwarded the
following message: { {I′x}Px , Bx
}na
A signed message where the filtered intermediate results I′x from the calculation on this node are the input data for the
next nodes nx. The input data is encrypted with the public key of the receivers. All data blobs Bx originate from the
coordinator and are forwarded unmodified to the nodes.
An example SMC-based privacy preserving computation using a coordinator nc and three nodes n1, n2, and n3 are
shown in Figure 2. The x values are the local values and the c values are used to count the number of values that is part
of the mean calculation. Each node has a sensitive local data value (x1, x2, and x3 respectively) that should participate
in the calculation of the mean value m. The coordinator starts by generating two large random numbers r0 and c0. The
large random number r0, combined with the encryption of the input data to the nodes, ensure that participating nodes
(and others) are unable to deduce the sensitive local data from previous nodes in the computing graph. The large
number c0 is used to hide what number the current node is in the computation chain and the total number of nodes
involved (this is not necessary to protect the local data at each node and is used only to reduce the information spread
about the current computation). The actual computing graph G for the calculation of the mean value m specified in
the format of the data blobs is:
G =
{


















(n3, p3), ∅, Ec
}nc
pc
Each blob contains the three values input node list, output node list and meta data. G is the overall graph and also
represents the starting point of the computation. Therefor, its input node list is empty. Bc represents the end point of
the computation and its output node list is empty. Each subpart (data blob) of the computing graph is signed by the
coordinator and encrypted with the public key of the node that has to access (and interpret) this information.
5. Workflow modeling
The focus on data in data-centric workflow modeling is a good basis for our focus on privacy preserved analysis
of community health research data. The D2Worm infrastructure’s Guard-Stage-Milestone (GSM) approach to model
workflows compromises of a logical information model and a declarative lifecycle model. The information model
contains two distinct sets of attribute types: (1) data attributes represent application-level data, and (2) status attributes
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n1 1© r1 = r0 + x1c1 = c0 + 1
n2
2© r2 = r1 + x2
c2 = c1 + 1
n33© r3 = r2 + x3c3 = c2 + 1
nc
4© m = r3 − r0
c3 − c0
0© r0 = random()
c0 = random()
{ {r0, c0}P1 , B1
}nc
{ {r1, c1}P2 , B2
}n1{ {r2, c2}P3 , B3
}n2
{ {r3, c3}Pc , ∅
}n3
Fig. 2. Privacy preserving calculation of the mean value m from the sensitive local data x1, x2, and x3 at nodes n1, n2, and n3, respectively.
describe the current state of the process according to its lifecycle. For the specification of the lifecycle model, GSM
provides three major building blocks: (1) stages hierarchically cluster the individual process tasks (aka activities).
A task definition in GSM requires the specification of input and output parameters, both taken from the information
model. Every stage can have two distinct states, opened and closed. A task enclosed within a stage can be only
executed if the stage is opened. Every stage has at least a single (2) guard that control when to open it. An opened
stage is intended to achieve one of the (3) milestones associated with it. Milestones represent business-relevant
objectives that can have two distinct states, achieved or invalidated.
The following example is based on the SMC-based privacy preserving example discussed above and presented
in Figure 2. One problem with the previous example is that the number of participating nodes are low. Statistical
analysis on small samples of data increase the possibility to use analytics to expose single sample values. To avoid
such privacy concerns we can introduce threshold values on the number of samples in the data set before we are
allowed to perform statistical analysis on them. In D2Worm we introduce conditions in the guard of stages to avoid
performing the calculation when the number of samples are to small.
Instead of using the standard graphical notation for GSM modelling, we have created our own more compact
notation that more easily can be used in SNOOP context.
The example includes one stage S i, where i ∈ [1 .. (n− 1)], for each such node. In addition, one initial stage S 0 and
one final stage S n are necessary in the example. The example use the following notation for each stage:
S : 〈 g 〉 M : ( m )
S are the label of the stage, g is the guard, M is the label of the milestone, and m is the milestone values. A stage can
have multiple guards and milestones:
S : 〈 g1 〉 | 〈 g2 〉 M1 : ( m1 ) | M2 : ( m2 ) | M3 : ( m3 )
In each stage the actual computation is listed. The conditions of the guards (sentries) are boolean expressions. If a
stage is reached or completed can be included in these expressions. ⊕S is true if we have reached stage S , and S is
true if stage S is completed.
Variables in bold font are representing local (and possible sensitive) data. Examples of such data are the private
encryption key of the node and local data that might be accessed to perform the computation (see for example Priv1
and v1 in Figure 4).
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrates how the calculation of the mean value m could be modelled in D2Worm. In this
example we are able to introduce a threshold value for the number of participating nodes (number of stages) that has
to be reached before the mean value is calculated. For privacy concerns, this approach can be used to avoid performing
statistical analysis on to small data sets.
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S 0 : 〈 calculate 〉 M0 : ( xe1, ce1, xe0, ce0 )
x0 = random()
c0 = random()
xe1 = encrypt(Pub1, x0)
ce1 = encrypt(Pub1, c0)
xe0 = encrypt(Pubn′ , x0)
ce0 = encrypt(Pubn, c0)
Fig. 3. Initial stage S n of privacy preserving calculation of mean value.
S 1 : 〈 S 0 〉 M1 : ( xe2, ce2 )
x1 = decrypt(Priv1, xe1) +
∑
v1
c1 = decrypt(Priv1, ce1) + |v1|
xe2 = encrypt(Pub2, x1)
ce2 = encrypt(Pub2, c1)
S i : 〈 S i−1 〉 Mi : ( xei+1, cei+1 )
xi = decrypt(Privi, xei ) +
∑
vi
ci = decrypt(Privi, cei ) + |vi|
xei+1 = encrypt(Pubi+1, xi)
cei+1 = encrypt(Pubi+1, ci)
Fig. 4. Stage S 1 and S i, where i ∈ [2 .. (n − 1)].
S n : 〈 S n−1 〉 Mn1: ( error ) | Mn2: ( m )
S n0 : 〈 ⊕S n 〉 Mn0: ( cn )
cn = decrypt(Privn, cen) − decrypt(Privn, ce0)
S n1 : 〈 S n0 ∧ cn < threshold 〉 Mn1: ( error )
error = true
S n2 : 〈 S n0 ∧ cn ≥ threshold 〉 Mn2: ( m )
Privn′ = release(n′)
m =
decrypt(Privn, xen) − decrypt(Privn′ , xe0)
cn
Fig. 5. Final stage S n of calculating mean value m. Includes sub-stages S n0 , S n1 and S n2 , where S n0 is an initial stage, S n1 makes S n reach the
error milestone Mn1 , and S n2 makes S n reach the successful milestone Mn2 with the correct mean value m.
6. Conclusion
Intervention in community health research involves multiple actors in a variety of arenas. It is often directed
towards towards the local community and children and their families. The consequence is that research in community
health is complex. Collecting data means that the researchers involve many actors. It can be children, parents, teachers,
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peers, social workers, doctors, and nurses, to give some examples. The analyse process is often based on vertically
partitioned datasets, which stresses ethical consideration because a selection of contributors is involved. Our approach
has the potential to deal with this complexity in community health research. Data centric workflow modelling is a
suitable approach to model complex analysis of data in community health research.
We have demonstrated how SNOOP can be used to perform privacy preserving distributed computation using
SMC-algorithms, and we have given an example on how data-centric workflow modelling in D2Worm can avoid
computation on to small data sets. In future work we will better integrate these two approaches. The existing workflow
management system in D2Worm are not capable to enforce data privacy, and it is problematic that GSM do not provide
the syntactical mechanisms to declare organisational boundaries and restricted data exchange across these. This can
be achieved with SNOOP integration and more expressiveness in the specification language.
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